The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play

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He Norwegian told the club's official website: "Manchester United is in my heart and it's brilliant to be coming back in this role. I'm really looking forward to working with the very talented squad we have, the staff and everyone at the club. United fired Mourinho Tuesday with the club languishing in sixth place in the English Premier League, 19 points behind leaders Liverpool after Sunday's insipid defeat at Anfield.

Photos: Solskjaer's Old Trafford career. At the time he was relatively unknown outside of Norway. Hide Caption. The striker became a vital member of the team, scoring goals in 11 seasons at Old Trafford. He was nicknamed the "baby-faced assassin" for his youthful image and killer instinct in front of goal.

Manchester United interim manager is Ole Gunnar Solskjaer - CNN

He became a United legend for scoring the winning goal in the Champions League final. His last-minute volley completed a stunning comeback against Bayern Munich. Solskjaer L retired in The Norwegian didn't leave the club entirely though. He spent three years managing the Manchester United reserve team, learning from Alex Ferguson. In , Solskjaer returned to Molde as the club's new first-team manager. He won consecutive domestic titles in a successful spell at his old side.

A return to the Premier League soon followed. In January , he took over Cardiff City but his time in Wales was less successful. His side were relegated into the Championship and Solskjaer was sacked after a bad start to his second season. Following his dismissal, Solskjaer returned to Molde to retake his position as first-team manager. With the Norwegian at the wheel, Manchester United's players looked rejuvenated -- with the likes of Paul Pogba shining under the new regime. United won its first eight games under Solskjaer and climbed back into contention for a top-four finish in the English Premier League.

Solskjaer's side overturned a two-goal deficit at the Parc des Princes stadium, courtesy of a last-gasp penalty by Marcus Rashford. On 28 March , Manchester United appointed Solskjaer as its new permanent manager. Solskjaer, who recently signed a new deal as manager of Norwegian club Molde, will take charge of his first match on Saturday, against Cardiff City -- a club he previously managed without much success.

Mike Phelan, a coach at United during Alex Ferguson's managerial reign, returns to the club as assistant manager. In a statement, United's chief executive Ed Woodward said: "Ole is a club legend with huge experience, both on the pitch and in coaching roles. We are confident they will unite the players and the fans as we head into the second half of the season.

The club said Solskjaer would remain in charge while the club conducted "a thorough recruitment process for a new full-time manager. So what else is new? ALL the same, the "Oops" analysis is valuable, maybe more so than the original study. For instance, eight of the fourteen flops didn't stay close to the customer—companies Like Avon, Disney, Revlon, Tupperware, and Levi-Strauss, which are practically synonymous with consumer satisfaction.

Take the last-named. As long as the worldwide jeans market was booming, Levi's management could afford, paradoxically, lo ignore it, "For so long we were [always. Our time was prioritized on getting more product, new factories, more raw materials. We were internationally oriented. Disney went on flogging clean and decent entertainment to an increasingly less wholesome marketplace. Yet turn the clock back a decade and what proved to be crucial defects were being hailed as heroic virtues.

Theories or methods of management can work wonders in individual companies at individual times, but only because they suit the way in which individual managers like to act in individual markets. The methods that Robert Townsend, of Further Up the Organization, used to run Avis were a marvelous way for Robert Townsend to run Avis, But they might paralyze a different company with different men—even Hertz, Yet executives, beset by corporate ailments, reach for a theory formed in a different context as if it were a broad-spectrum antibiotic, a wonder drug- They see their businesses as suffering patients requiting medical treatment, though there is seldom anything wrong with a company that better, or better-directed, executives won't cure.

Executives, however, will undergo almost any treatment rather than amputation of themselves. But self-amputation is far more effective for the stockholders..

I know of two companies, one Urge, one gargantuan, that found themselves with cuckoos in the nest—two tough, aggressive, ruthless entrepreneurs whose drive, hunger for profits, and magical rapport with figures couldn't live with the passive, profitless vagueness on the existing board. Laying their own heads on the block, the older directors voluntarily handed the ax to the new men. In the next few years, both companies grew by such prodigious.

They followed the golden rule: if you can't do something yourself, find somebody who can—and then let him do it in his own sweet way.


In contrast, many cures that less self-effacing boards may purchase are subject to the same objection as psychoanalysis: they are expensive; they take a Jot of time; he patient does all the work; and there's no way of telling that he wouldn't have gotten better, anyway, with the mere passage of the years. If it takes two years to take one example from the past to draw up a new shop-floor management structure in a car company, the problem won't be the same at the end as it was at the beginning. That's why, in the discontinuous present, speed has become of the essence. Today you not only have to fix it, you must fix it fast.

Any improvement, however, can always be looked at two ways. You can pat yourself on the back as most executives do for your brilliant advance, or you can kick yourself for the imbecility that made improvement necessary. If the executive doesn't like one view through the telescope; he can turn it around and look through the other end—precisely because management is not a scientific and objective activity but a subjective historical process, full of ifs and buts.

Thus Roy Ash, when president of Litton and forced to explain how the management wasn't to blame for errors that wiped out billions in stock market value, had no trouble at all: "Operationally, we could have made sure of never facing the problem by newer undertaking. Thai's like the guilty party in a midair collision offering as excuse that if he had never learned to fly the accident would never have happened. The literature and history of companies like Litton or ITT bear careful reading by anybody who believes that the emperor-manager is wearing clothes. In this book, although there are no heroes, there are Goodies and Baddies.

The Baddies range from leading actors—the bankrupt or all-but-broke giant companies like International Harvester or Continental Illinois—to a strong supporting cast, many of them conglomerates like the two mentioned above, whose badness lies in the damage done by arrogant managers to innocent stockholders. In the early s, in addition to the Baddies, the Heavies —such as du Pont, General Electric, ICI, and General Motors —were conspicuous underperformers, companies that were neither very good nor at all poor but whose enormous potential for goodness was constantly frustrated by their own bad habits.

Many such Heavies proved in extremis in the early s, with GM leading the bunch, that the under-performance was indeed culpable; they changed their awful habits, and that enormous potential came bungling through onto the bottom line. But management is a far more homely business than its would-be scientists suggest, more closely allied to cooking than any other human activity. Like cooking, it rests On a degree of Organization and on adequate resources.


But just as no two chefs run their kitchens the same way, so no two managements are the same, even if they all went to the same business or cooking school. You can teach the rudiments of cooking, as of management, but you cannot make a great cook or a great manager. In both activities, you ignore fundamentals at grave risk —but sometimes succeed.

In both, science can be extremely useful but is no substitute for the art itself. In both, inspired amateurs can outdo professionals. In both, perfection is rarely achieved, and failure is more common than the customers realize. In both, practitioners don't need recipes that detail timing down to the last second, ingredients to the last fraction of an ounce, and procedures down to the Just flick of the wrist; they need reliable maxims, instructive anecdotes, and no dogmatism. This is a cookbook for managers who want to get their clothes back. To hear them tell it, big company directors on both sides of the Atlantic arc quite dedicated to the stockholder.

Strangely, devotion turns to irritation, almost a sense of betrayal, if the Love object asks offensive questions about the company's performance at the annual genera] meeting. Most top executives are sincere men. What's good for the board of General Motors is good for the stockholders, and vice vena, more or less sums up the philosophy. Suppose that the stockholders would be better off with a whale new management. The existing managers won't share the horrible idea and they won't protect stockholders by lopping off their own heads.

The stockholder is not expected to criticize. It's enough to know that managements, in deciding what they want, will have general objectives that directly promote the stockholder's everlasting comfort—or will they? That was before a series or disasters, starting with the Nixon recession and proceeding through oil price shocks, hyperinflation, and the great deflation of the late , gave business hell—and brought it down to earth. In happier days the hotter giants, the Honey wells and so on, dreamed of a 15 percent annual compound increase in earnings per share.

But this corporate target has a secret advantage for the men in charge of companies. Earnings per share are engineered by dividing profits attributable to ordinary stockholders that is, after tax and minority interest by the number of shares in issue, which is a beautifully elastic sum on both sides. But if A uses money borrowed at fixed interest, any margin between B's profits and the interest paid comes through as a straight, juicy increment in earnings per share. As the conglomerates of the s noted, many tricks can be worked around this basic dodge: simply buy earnings without diluting the.

This cult of earnings per share has never been worshiped as widely in Britain as in the United States, where management has elaborated much the same concept into something still widely used called "return on invested capital" or "stockholders' equity. The notion behind invested capital is that only the money that belongs to the stockholder counts. So you conveniently forget about loans, however overpowering, and take the often much tinier sum of stockholders' capital.

This in turn relates to asset values that have been shrunk by so-called depreciation over the years. To this much skinnier residue, you apply the net profit figure—and the result is a much zestier index of performance than could be gotten in any other way. For example, Dr. Armand Hammer's Occidental Petroleum earned a worse-than-middling 7. As a percentage of assets, the miserable figure shrank to under 5 percent. The return on assets figure?

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Only At Philip Morris, the tobacco champions, an awesome equity return of At Lockheed, the equity return was no less than This is dangerous— it sustains the myth that high debt is good for the company, and it also misrepresents the motivation of the board. Though the director chatters about the stockholder as the owner of the company's assets, he doesn't really see the investor as a proprietor—and still less as a member of the company.

The members, in the director's inner mind, are those sitting on the payroll, above all upper management itself.

The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play
The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play
The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play
The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play
The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play
The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play
The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play
The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play

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